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1 Introduction
Economic agents are often faced with the dilemma of acting in their own
interest or pursuing a more cooperative course of action. Well-known ex-
amples of such environments include common-pool resource or rent-seeking
environments, price and quantity competition, voluntary contribution mech-
anisms, arms races, and tariff competition. A challenging task for researchers
is to identify conditions under which agents are more cooperative than the
Nash equilibrium based on the assumption of narrowly self-interested behav-
ior would predict (see e.g., Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Davis and Holt, 1993;
Ledyard, 1995). In this paper we present results from a laboratory exper-
iment designed to examine whether the extent of cooperation in dilemma
environments is related to the nature of strategic interaction, that is, strate-
gic complements versus substitutes.
Whether choices of agents i and j are strategic complements or strategic
substitutes depends on the effect of agent i’s choice on the marginal payoff
of agent j’s choice. The effect is positive in case of strategic complements
and negative in case of strategic substitutes (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984;
Bulow et al., 1985):
∂2πi
∂xi∂xj
> 0(< 0) in games of strategic complements (substitutes).
The sign of the cross-effect corresponds to the sign of the best response
function’s slope (at least locally). So, an important implication of strategic
substitutability is that a change in one agent’s choice gives the other agent
an incentive to move in the opposite direction. This is, for example, the
case in a common-pool resource game, a public good game with a decel-
erating production function, a quantity-choice game with substitute goods,
and a price-setting game with complementary goods. Instead, with strategic
complementarity, the incentive for agents is to move in the same direction.
Examples are a public good game with an accelerating production function,
a quantity-choice game with substitute goods, and a price-setting game with
complementary goods1.
We hypothesize that strategic complementarity facilitates cooperation in
a dilemma environment compared to strategic substitutability. The reason
is that in case of strategic complements even a self-interested agent, act-
ing in accordance with the best response function, will partially follow a
cooperative move made by another agent. In case of strategic substitutes,
1Eaton (2004) provides more examples of dilemma environments that are either char-
acterized by strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity.
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a self-interested agent will partially off-set a cooperative move. For exam-
ple, in case of oligopolistic price competition with substitute goods (strategic
complements), if a firm that aims at colluding sets a price above the Nash
equilibrium level, then the best response for the competitor is to set a price
above the Nash equilibrium level as well. In this scenario, the average price
will always be more collusive than the Nash equilibrium price. In case of
quantity competition with substitute goods (strategic substitutes), however,
if a firm sets a (collusive) quantity below the Nash equilibrium level, then
a best-responding firm will set a quantity above the Nash equilibrium level.
The average outcome will now, all else equal, deviate to a lesser extent from
the Nash prediction than in case of strategic complements. The theoretical
work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1991, 1993) that highlights the impor-
tance of the nature of strategic interaction for aggregate outcomes is based on
this intuition. They show that non-responding (e.g., altruistic) agents tend to
have a disproportionate impact on the aggregate outcome if the environment
is characterized by strategic complementarity.
In much the same vein our hypothesis is supported by models that analyze
the strategic effect of altruistic preferences in two-player games (see, e.g.,
Rotemberg, 1994; Bester and Güth, 1998). The main idea is that under
strategic substitutability being altruistic is detrimental in material payoff
terms, because altruistic acts (such as moving from the Nash equilibrium
in the direction of the joint payoff maximum) are never followed by a self-
interested agent. In games of strategic complements, however, being at least
somewhat altruistic does pay off: it triggers a favorable response by a self-
interested agent, and this improves both agents’ material payoffs.
The experiment discussed in this paper is designed in order to examine ce-
teris paribus whether the nature of strategic interaction has an impact on the
extent of cooperation in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-
dominated Nash equilibrium, which is a well-known class of social dilemma
games. It consists of neutrally framed strategic substitutes and complements
treatments with the same standard theoretical benchmarks and correspond-
ing payoffs. In order to control for the sign of the externality—the literature
on framing effects in public goods experiments suggests that environments
with a positive externality are more prone to deviations towards cooperative
play than environments with a negative externality2—we included treatments
with a positive externality and treatments with a negative externality.
A number of experimental studies is related to ours. In the experimen-
2See Andreoni (1995); Sonnemans et al. (1998); Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999); Park
(2000) and Zelmer (2003). Brewer and Kramer (1986), however, find a framing effect in
the opposite direction of Andreoni’s original results.
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tal industrial organization literature, for instance, there are indications that
in a strategic complements environment play is more cooperative than in a
strategic substitutes environment3. However, these experiments do not give
conclusive evidence on the effect of the type strategic interaction since the ce-
teris paribus condition is not satisfied. Firstly, actions are differently framed
in different treatments (e.g., price versus quantity choices). Secondly, the
sign of the externality covaries with the type of strategic interaction. For ex-
ample, typical Cournot games are characterized by negative externalities and
strategic substitutes, while Bertrand games have positive externalities and
strategic complements. Finally, in the experiments the benchmark outcomes
and payoffs (Nash, joint profit maximum, optimal defection) vary with the
type of strategic interaction. In our experiment, we rule out these potential
confounds.
Also related is the experimental study by Fehr and Tyran (2002)4. Moti-
vated by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989), they examine the adjust-
ment of prices after a macro-economic shock. They find that this adjustment
is slower if the game has strategic complementarities compared to a case of
strategic substitutability. An important difference with our study is that
Fehr and Tyran focus on the speed of convergence and do not address is-
sues of cooperation. This is reflected in their choice to implement games
with an efficient Nash equilibrium. Fehr and Tyran explicitly mention that
they want to rule out “that collusion slows down adjustment towards equi-
librium”5. Whether collusion (cooperation) occurs more frequently under
strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability is precisely
what we are interested in.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain
the experimental design and the procedures. The experimental results are
presented in section 3 and section 4 contains concluding remarks.
3See Holt (1995); Huck et al. (2000); Davis (2002) and Suetens and Potters (2005) for
Bertrand/Cournot applications and Suetens (2005) for an R&D application.
4See Fehr and Tyran (2005) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) for discussions of other
related experimental findings.
5Chen and Gazzale (2004) is a study that examines the impact of the degree of strategic
complementarity on the speed of convergence towards equilibrium. In their study the




Since our aim is to examine whether the nature of strategic interdependence
has an influence on cooperation in dilemma games, we design strategic sub-
stitutes (SUBST) and strategic complements (COMPL) treatments. In all
treatments fixed pairs of subjects play a finite repetition of the same stage
game. We implement quadratic payoff functions, and ensure that the stage
game is dominance-solvable, has a unique and Pareto-dominated Nash equi-
librium, and a symmetric socially efficient outcome. Games characterized
by strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity have externalities
by nature6. In case of a negative externality the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by lower actions and vice versa for games with a positive external-
ity (see Eaton and Eswaran, 2002). In our design we deal with this potential
confound by running SUBST and COMPL treatments for both positive and
negative externality cases. This gives the following four treatments:
1. strategic substitutes
(a) negative externalities (SUBSTneg)
(b) positive externalities (SUBSTpos)
2. strategic complements
(a) negative externalities (COMPLneg)
(b) positive externalities (COMPLpos).
It is straightforward to show that transforming a symmetric game with
positive externalities into one with negative externalities can be done with-
out changing incentives. Suppose that the decision variable of player i in a
positive externality game is represented by xi, with xi ∈ [0,m]. The transfor-
mation of this game into one with a negative externality—without changing
incentives—is achieved by replacing the decision variable xi by m − yi for
i = 1, 2, where yi is the decision variable of player i in the corresponding
negative externality game. The transformation is related to the transfor-
mation of a public good into a public bad game, or of a give-some into a
take-some game (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1995; van Dijk and Wilke, 2000).
For the comparison across treatments to be ‘clean’, we require that both
theoretical benchmarks—the Nash equilibrium and the joint payoff maximum








(JPM)—are the same in the COMPL and SUBST treatments. We want to
exclude the possibility that the mere location of these benchmarks within the
strategy space could cause any of the treatments to appear more cooperative.
For instance, if behavior were random and uniform over the strategy space
then all of the treatments should look equally non-cooperative. Also we want
the payoff levels of the two benchmarks to be the same across the treatments.
Moreover, we impose the restriction that the ‘optimal defection payoff’— that
is, the best response to fully cooperative play by the other player—is the same
across the different treatments. This implies that an analysis on the scope
for cooperation in the spirit of Friedman (1971) gives the same outcome in
all treatments. A final restriction is that the absolute values of the slopes
of the (linear) best response functions are the same in the treatments. This
ensures that learning processes such as best-reply dynamics and fictitious
play generate the same speed of convergence across SUBST and COMPL.
Our requirements for SUBST and COMPL can be summarized as follows.
1. Same Nash equilibrium choice,
2. same Nash equilibrium payoff,
3. same JPM choice (conditional the sign of the externality),
4. same JPM payoff,
5. same optimal defection payoff,
6. same absolute values of the slopes of the best response functions.
Figure 1 visualizes requirements 1, 3 and 6. The Nash equilibrium is in
the middle of the strategy space in each of the treatments. The distance
to the JPM point is the same in all treatments. The (linear) best response
functions are equally ‘steep’ across the treatments.
We use quadratic payoff functions with six parameters for the stage
games. This allows us to impose the six requirements listed above. The
payoff function of player i in a two-player positive externality COMPL game
is defined as follows:
π
COMPLpos




j + fxixj, (1)
with b, c, d, f > 0, e ≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. It is easy to verify that the
game generates a positive externality and is one of strategic complements.






where 2d > f for xNash to be strictly positive. The joint payoff maximizing
choice is also unique and symmetric:
xJPM =
b + c
2(d − e − f)
, (3)





































Figure 1: Best-response functions, Nash and JPM choices
In a SUBSTpos game the payoff of player i is defined as follows:
π
SUBSTpos




j − ζxixj, (4)
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with β, γ, δ, ζ > 0, ǫ ≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. The game is one of strategic
substitutes and for the game to generate a positive externality, the condition
γ + 2ǫxj − ζxi > 0 should be satisfied. The unique and symmetric Nash





and the symmetric joint payoff maximizing choice is equal to
xJPM =
β + γ
2(δ − ǫ + ζ)
, (6)
where δ > ǫ − ζ for xJPM to be strictly positive. For the JPM choice to be
symmetric, the condition δ > ǫ + ζ should hold.
As we argued before, transforming a positive into a negative externality
game is achieved by replacing the choice variable xi by m− yi. For the Nash
equilibria to be the same across positive and negative externality games, the




, and minimum and maximum actions are the same across all
treatments.
The six restrictions are satisfied, if the parameters α, β, γ, δ, ǫ and ζ are
























































The parameters we used for the experiment are a = 28, b = 5.474, c =
0.01, d = 0.278, e = 0.0055 and f = 0.165 (which gives m = 28). Table 1 pro-
7It can be shown that the so-called ‘sucker payoff’, i.e., the payoff of cooperating while
the other player defects, is smaller in COMPL than in SUBST if these requirements are
met. In other words, it is worse to be cheated on in COMPL than in SUBST in terms
of payoff loss. From this perspective one might hypothesize there to be less cooperation
in COMPL than in SUBST (cf. the cooperation index and index of conflict suggested by
Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1967, respectively).
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SUBST COMPL
SUBSTneg SUBSTpos COMPLneg COMPLpos
choicemin 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
choicemax 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0
choiceNash 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
choiceJPM 2.5 25.5 2.5 25.5
πNash 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71
πJPM 41.94 41.94 41.94 41.94
πdefect 60.14 60.14 60.14 60.14
slope -0.30 -0.30 0.30 0.30
Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks in the experiment
vides an overview of the main theoretical benchmarks in the four treatments
for the parameter constellation used in the experiment8.
2.2 Procedure
Six computerized sessions have been conducted in CentERlab at Tilburg
University in November 2004 covering the four treatments9. In each of the
first four sessions one of the four treatments has been run, and in the final
two sessions mixes of all treatments have been run in order to balance the
number of observations across the four treatments. 110 students participated
8We tried to maximize the absolute value of the reaction curves’ slope so as to sharpen
possible contrasts between strategic substitutes and complements. In doing this we are
constrained by the requirement that yJPM ≥ 0. Assume that c is very small such that it
becomes negligible; c ≈ 0. In that case the expression for yJPM ≥ 0 reduces to
yJPM =
b(2d − 4e − 3f)
2(d − e − f)(2d − f)
, (8)
and the condition yJPM ≥ 0 reduces to 2d ≥ 4e+3f since d > e+f and 2d > f . If we also






. In other words,







and the absolute value of the slope will always be strictly smaller than
1/3.
9We used the experimental software toolkit z-Tree to program the experiment (see
Fischbacher, 1999).
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in the experiment. They were recruited through e-mail lists of students in-
terested in participating in experiments. Each treatment had 28 participants
corresponding to 14 independent observations (pairs), except treatment SUB-
STneg which had 26 participants or 13 independent observations.
All participants received the same instructions (see appendix A). The
treatments only differed with respect to the payoff function. The subjects
were informed on how their earnings depended on their own choices and on
the choices of one other participant in the session, which remained the same
during the entire experiment. They were asked to choose a number between
0.0 and 28.0 in each round10. Subjects could calculate their earnings in points
by means of a payoff table for combinations of hypothetical choices that are
multiples of two, and by means of an earnings calculator on the computer
screen for any combination of hypothetical choices11. They were explicitly
told that choices were not restricted to be multiples of two.
The same static game was repeated 31 times including a trial round which
did not count to calculate earnings. Earnings were denoted in points and
transferred to cash at a rate of 100 points = 1 EUR. Subjects were informed
on the number of rounds. The sessions lasted between 50 and 55 minutes
and average earnings were 9.30 EUR.
3 Experimental results
The data are presented in terms of the degree of cooperation which for pair
k in round t is defined as:
ρkt =




ρkt = 0 when the average choice of pair k in round t is the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, while ρkt = 1 when it is the joint payoff maximum. When
the average choice of the pair is between the Nash and the JPM benchmark,
0 < ρkt < 1. Average choices more competitive than the Nash equilibrium
imply that ρkt < 0. This transformation of choices is made in order to
simplify comparison across treatments and has no impact on any of our
conclusions12.
10The number of possible decimal points was limited to one.
11Earnings in points were rounded at two decimals. Pay-off tables are in appendix A. In
order to show the difference in the best response functions between strategic substitutes
and complements, best responses for multiples of two are marked in grey (which was not
the case in the experiment).
12Alternatively, the degree of cooperation could have been calculated in terms of the
average realized payoffs: (average payoffs - Nash payoffs)/(JPM payoffs - Nash payoffs).
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Figure 2: Average degree of cooperation
A first result is that the sign of the externality does not effect the de-
gree of cooperation in SUBST nor in COMPL. Averaged over the pairs and
over the rounds, the degree of cooperation is 0.24 in SUBSTneg as compared
to 0.17 in SUBSTpos, and it is 0.49 in COMPLneg as compared to 0.42
in COMPLpos. These differences are not statistically significant13. There-
fore, in what follows we pool SUBSTneg and SUBSTpos into SUBST and
COMPLneg and COMPLpos into COMPL.
Our main experimental result is expressed in figure 2, which depicts the
evolution of the average degree of cooperation in the SUBST and COMPL
treatments. Clearly, the data support the hypothesis that strategic com-
plementarity facilitates cooperation compared to strategic substitutability.
Table 2 provides statistical details for all rounds combined (1-30), and sepa-
rately for the first half (1-15) and the second half (16-30) of the experiment.
The second and third column give averages (and standard deviations) of the
degree of cooperation for SUBST and COMPL, respectively. The p-values in
the 4th column correspond to Mann-Whitney-U test statistics of the null hy-
pothesis that the degree of cooperation is the same in SUBST and COMPL.
H0 is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the degree of coop-
eration is larger in COMPL than in SUBST.
Figure 2 further shows that end-effects have occurred in all treatments,
Doing so does not alter any of our conclusions.
13Nonparametric test statistics for H0 : ρ̄




rounds 1-30 0.20 (0.41) 0.45 (0.38) 0.012
rounds 1-15 0.13 (0.38) 0.40 (0.39) 0.006
rounds 16-30 0.27 (0.54) 0.51 (0.40) 0.050
N 27 28
aH1 : ρ̄SUBST < ρ̄COMPL (one-tailed)
Table 2: Treatment effect: SUBST versus COMPL
which is common in finitely repeated social dilemma games (see e.g. Ledyard,
1995; Selten and Stoecker, 1986). This suggests that cooperation during the
experiment is at least partly due to strategic considerations. The end-effect
is significantly stronger in SUBST than in COMPL, which is not surpris-
ing given the difference in the best response function between SUBST and
COMPL.
As we outlined in the introduction, the hypothesis for differences in the
degree of cooperation is based on the fact that strategic complementarity
gives a player an incentive to follow behavioral changes of the other player,
while strategic substitutability gives a player an incentive to move in the
opposite direction. However, we cannot fully recover these behavioral pat-
terns from the data. In fact, we find that a behavioral change by one player
is on average followed by a move in the same direction by the other player
in both COMPL and SUBST. This implies that if one player moves toward
the joint payoff maximum, the average move of the other player in the next
round is in the same direction in COMPL as well as in SUBST. However, the
extent to which such a move is followed is significantly greater in COMPL
than in SUBST on average14. This pattern can be explained well by the
presence of reciprocal players, that is, players who respond cooperatively to
cooperative acts and non-cooperatively to non-cooperative acts15. Since such
players follow cooperative choices by others, their presence generates a form
of strategic complementarity. This endogenous strategic complementarity is
strengthened by the strategic complementarity embedded in the payoff struc-
ture of COMPL, while it is—at least partially—compensated by the strategic
substitutability inherent in SUBST.
14For example, a panel regression of ∆xit on ∆xjt−1 with individual AR(1) error pro-
cesses gives an estimated slope of 0.10 for SUBST and 0.31 for COMPL.
15There exists ample evidence for the presence of such players. See, for instance, Axelrod
and Hamilton (1981), Fischbacher et al. (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2005).
12
4 Concluding remarks
We find experimental evidence for the hypothesis that environments with
strategic complements lead to more cooperative play than comparable envi-
ronments with strategic substitutes. At the same time, we find no evidence
for an effect of the sign of the externality on the degree of cooperation. Our
findings fit together with what Fehr and Tyran (2005) and Camerer and Fehr
(2006) propose: under strategic complementarity, and not so under strate-
gic substitutability, a small number of so-called less-rational—for instance,
reciprocal and conditionally cooperative—agents may drive the aggregate
outcome away from the fully rational equilibrium.
In his survey on industrial organization experiments, Holt notes that it
seems easier to collude in Bertrand price-setting games than in Cournot
quantity-setting games: “if tacit collusion causes prices to be above non-
cooperative levels in price-choice environments, then why do quantities tend
to be above noncooperative, Cournot levels (...)?” (Holt, 1995, pages 423–
424). Our results suggest that these differences are, at least partly, due to
the sign of the best response function’s slope, and not, for example, to the
sign of the externality. The same suggestion applies to the higher degree
of cooperation that has been found in experimental R&D games with tech-
nological spillovers (strategic complements) than in those without spillovers
(strategic substitutes) (see Suetens, 2005).
It is not only in industrial organization that the prevalence of voluntary
cooperation may interact in an important way with the type of strategic in-
teraction. Consider, for example, a situation where individuals are asked to
make contributions to a public good, which is as a matter of fact character-
ized by positive externalities. Depending on whether the production of the
public good has decreasing or increasing returns-to-scale, contributions are
strategic substitutes or complements, respectively. Team production, where
members of a team decide how much effort to put into a team task, is another
example of a situation with positive externalities where actions can be either
strategic substitutes or complements. Strategic complementarities are also
likely to be present in dilemma environments such as arms races between
enemy nations and conspicuous consumption, while common-pool resource
dilemmas, strategic trade policy and patent races rather tend to be charac-
terized by strategic substitutability. Due recognition of the underlying type
of strategic interaction can help us understand the scope for cooperation in
each of these environments.
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Appendix A: Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision-making and
will be asked to make a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At the end of the
experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants.
If something is not clear, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Your earnings depend on your own decisions and on the decisions of one
other participant. The identity of the other participant will not be revealed.
The other participant remains the same during the entire experiment and
will be referred to by ‘the other’ in what follows.
The experiment consists of 30 periods. In each period you have to choose
a number between 0.0 and 28.0. The other also chooses a number between
0.0 and 28.0. Your earnings in points depend on your choice and the other’s
choice. The table attached to these instructions gives information about your
earnings for some combinations of your choice and the other’s choice. The
other gets the same table.
You can calculate your and the other’s earnings in more detail (for choices
that are no multiples of 2 for instance) by using the EARNINGS CALCULA-
TOR on your screen. By filling in a hypothetical value for your own choice
and a hypothetical value for the other’s choice you can calculate your and
the other’s earnings for this combination of choices.
You enter your decision under DECISION ENTRY by clicking on ‘Enter’.
In each period you have about 1 minute to enter your decision.
After each period you are informed about the other’s choice and your
and the other’s earnings in that period. A history of your and the other’s
past choices and earnings is available at the bottom right of your computer
screen.
The first period is a trial period and does not count when calculating
your earnings. Your total earnings in points are the sum of your earnings in
points over the 30 periods. Your earnings in points will be converted into




The other’s choice       → 
 
 
 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 41.27 36.50 31.91 27.50 23.27 19.22 15.36 11.68 8.18 4.87 1.73 -1.22 -3.99 -6.57 -8.98
2.0 46.88 41.91 37.13 32.52 28.10 23.86 19.81 15.93 12.24 8.73 5.40 2.26 -0.71 -3.49 -6.09
4.0 51.84 46.68 41.70 36.90 32.28 27.85 23.60 19.53 15.64 11.94 8.42 5.08 1.92 -1.05 -3.85
6.0 56.14 50.78 45.61 40.62 35.81 31.18 26.74 22.47 18.39 14.49 10.78 7.25 3.89 0.72 -2.26
8.0 59.79 54.24 48.87 43.68 38.68 33.86 29.22 24.76 20.49 16.40 12.49 8.76 5.21 1.85 -1.33
10.0 62.78 57.04 51.48 46.10 40.90 35.88 31.05 26.40 21.93 17.64 13.54 9.62 5.88 2.32 -1.06
12.0 65.12 59.18 53.43 47.85 42.46 37.25 32.22 27.38 22.72 18.24 13.94 9.82 5.89 2.14 -1.43
14.0 66.81 60.67 54.72 48.96 43.37 37.97 32.75 27.71 22.85 18.17 13.68 9.37 5.24 1.30 -2.46
16.0 67.84 61.51 55.37 49.41 43.63 38.03 32.61 27.38 22.33 17.46 12.77 8.27 3.95 -0.19 -4.15
18.0 68.22 61.70 55.36 49.20 43.23 37.43 31.83 26.40 21.15 16.09 11.21 6.51 2.00 -2.34 -6.49
20.0 67.94 61.23 54.69 48.34 42.17 36.19 30.38 24.76 19.32 14.07 8.99 4.10 -0.61 -5.14 -9.48
22.0 67.01 60.10 53.37 46.83 40.47 34.29 28.29 22.47 16.84 11.39 6.12 1.03 -3.87 -8.59 -13.13
24.0 65.43 58.32 51.40 44.66 38.11 31.73 25.54 19.53 13.70 8.06 2.59 -2.69 -7.78 -12.70 -17.43






28.0 60.29 52.80 45.49 38.37 31.42 24.66 18.08 11.68 5.47 -0.57 -6.42 -12.09 -17.57 -22.88 -28.00
 




The other’s choice       → 
 
 
 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 -28.00 -22.88 -17.57 -12.09 -6.42 -0.57 5.47 11.68 18.08 24.66 31.42 38.37 45.49 52.80 60.29
2.0 -22.39 -17.46 -12.35 -7.06 -1.58 4.07 9.91 15.93 22.14 28.52 35.09 41.84 48.77 55.89 63.19
4.0 -17.43 -12.70 -7.78 -2.69 2.59 8.06 13.70 19.53 25.54 31.73 38.11 44.66 51.40 58.32 65.43
6.0 -13.13 -8.59 -3.87 1.03 6.12 11.39 16.84 22.47 28.29 34.29 40.47 46.83 53.37 60.10 67.01
8.0 -9.48 -5.14 -0.61 4.10 8.99 14.07 19.32 24.76 30.38 36.19 42.17 48.34 54.69 61.23 67.94
10.0 -6.49 -2.34 2.00 6.51 11.21 16.09 21.15 26.40 31.83 37.43 43.23 49.20 55.36 61.70 68.22
12.0 -4.15 -0.19 3.95 8.27 12.77 17.46 22.33 27.38 32.61 38.03 43.63 49.41 55.37 61.51 67.84
14.0 -2.46 1.30 5.24 9.37 13.68 18.17 22.85 27.71 32.75 37.97 43.37 48.96 54.72 60.67 66.81
16.0 -1.43 2.14 5.89 9.82 13.94 18.24 22.72 27.38 32.22 37.25 42.46 47.85 53.43 59.18 65.12
18.0 -1.06 2.32 5.88 9.62 13.54 17.64 21.93 26.40 31.05 35.88 40.90 46.10 51.48 57.04 62.78
20.0 -1.33 1.85 5.21 8.76 12.49 16.40 20.49 24.76 29.22 33.86 38.68 43.68 48.87 54.24 59.79
22.0 -2.26 0.72 3.89 7.25 10.78 14.49 18.39 22.47 26.74 31.18 35.81 40.62 45.61 50.78 56.14
24.0 -3.85 -1.05 1.92 5.08 8.42 11.94 15.64 19.53 23.60 27.85 32.28 36.90 41.70 46.68 51.84






28.0 -8.98 -6.57 -3.99 -1.22 1.73 4.87 8.18 11.68 15.36 19.22 23.27 27.50 31.91 36.50 41.27
 




The other’s choice       → 
 
 
 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 41.27 31.42 21.61 11.84 2.12 -7.56 -17.19 -26.78 -36.33 -45.83 -55.29 -64.70 -74.07 -83.40 -92.68
2.0 51.11 41.91 32.76 23.66 14.60 5.58 -3.40 -12.33 -21.21 -30.05 -38.85 -47.61 -56.32 -64.98 -73.60
4.0 58.72 50.19 41.70 33.25 24.85 16.49 8.18 -0.09 -8.32 -16.50 -24.64 -32.73 -40.78 -48.79 -56.75
6.0 64.11 56.23 48.40 40.62 32.88 25.18 17.52 9.91 2.35 -5.17 -12.65 -20.09 -27.48 -34.82 -42.12
8.0 67.27 60.06 52.89 45.76 38.68 31.64 24.65 17.70 10.79 3.93 -2.89 -9.66 -16.39 -23.08 -29.72
10.0 68.21 61.66 55.15 48.68 42.26 35.88 29.55 23.26 17.01 10.81 4.65 -1.46 -7.53 -13.56 -19.54
12.0 66.93 61.03 55.18 49.38 43.62 37.90 32.22 26.59 21.01 15.47 9.97 4.51 -0.90 -6.26 -11.58
14.0 63.42 58.19 53.00 47.85 42.75 37.69 32.68 27.71 22.78 17.90 13.06 8.27 3.52 -1.19 -5.85
16.0 57.69 53.11 48.58 44.10 39.66 35.26 30.90 26.59 22.33 18.11 13.93 9.79 5.70 1.66 -2.34
18.0 49.73 45.82 41.95 38.12 34.34 30.60 26.91 23.26 19.65 16.09 12.57 9.10 5.67 2.28 -1.06
20.0 39.55 36.30 33.09 29.92 26.80 23.72 20.69 17.70 14.75 11.85 8.99 6.18 3.41 0.68 -2.00
22.0 27.15 24.55 22.00 19.50 17.04 14.62 12.24 9.91 7.63 5.39 3.19 1.03 -1.08 -3.14 -5.16
24.0 12.52 10.59 8.70 6.85 5.05 3.29 1.58 -0.09 -1.72 -3.30 -4.84 -6.33 -7.78 -9.19 -10.55






28.0 -23.41 -24.02 -24.59 -25.12 -25.60 -26.04 -26.43 -26.78 -27.09 -27.35 -27.57 -27.74 -27.87 -27.96 -28.00
 




The other’s choice       → 
 
 
 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 -28.00 -27.96 -27.87 -27.74 -27.57 -27.35 -27.09 -26.78 -26.43 -26.04 -25.60 -25.12 -24.59 -24.02 -23.41
2.0 -18.16 -17.46 -16.72 -15.93 -15.09 -14.21 -13.29 -12.33 -11.32 -10.26 -9.16 -8.02 -6.84 -5.61 -4.33
4.0 -10.55 -9.19 -7.78 -6.33 -4.84 -3.30 -1.72 -0.09 1.58 3.29 5.05 6.85 8.70 10.59 12.52
6.0 -5.16 -3.14 -1.08 1.03 3.19 5.39 7.63 9.91 12.24 14.62 17.04 19.50 22.00 24.55 27.15
8.0 -2.00 0.68 3.41 6.18 8.99 11.85 14.75 17.70 20.69 23.72 26.80 29.92 33.09 36.30 39.55
10.0 -1.06 2.28 5.67 9.10 12.57 16.09 19.65 23.26 26.91 30.60 34.34 38.12 41.95 45.82 49.73
12.0 -2.34 1.66 5.70 9.79 13.93 18.11 22.33 26.59 30.90 35.26 39.66 44.10 48.58 53.11 57.69
14.0 -5.85 -1.19 3.52 8.27 13.06 17.90 22.78 27.71 32.68 37.69 42.75 47.85 53.00 58.19 63.42
16.0 -11.58 -6.26 -0.90 4.51 9.97 15.47 21.01 26.59 32.22 37.90 43.62 49.38 55.18 61.03 66.93
18.0 -19.54 -13.56 -7.53 -1.46 4.65 10.81 17.01 23.26 29.55 35.88 42.26 48.68 55.15 61.66 68.21
20.0 -29.72 -23.08 -16.39 -9.66 -2.89 3.93 10.79 17.70 24.65 31.64 38.68 45.76 52.89 60.06 67.27
22.0 -42.12 -34.82 -27.48 -20.09 -12.65 -5.17 2.35 9.91 17.52 25.18 32.88 40.62 48.40 56.23 64.11
24.0 -56.75 -48.79 -40.78 -32.73 -24.64 -16.50 -8.32 -0.09 8.18 16.49 24.85 33.25 41.70 50.19 58.72






28.0 -92.68 -83.40 -74.07 -64.70 -55.29 -45.83 -36.33 -26.78 -17.19 -7.56 2.12 11.84 21.61 31.42 41.27
 
Figure 6: Pay-off table for COMPLpos
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Appendix B: Externality treatment effects
ρ̄SUBST (s.d.) ρ̄COMPL (s.d.)
neg pos p-value neg pos p-value
rounds 1-30 0.24 (0.42) 0.17 (0.41) 0.519a 0.49 (0.42) 0.42 (0.36) 0.795a
rounds 1-15 0.22 (0.39) 0.06 (0.37) 0.128a 0.45 (0.43) 0.34 (0.35) 0.511a
rounds 16-30 0.26 (0.53) 0.28 (0.56) 0.730b 0.53 (0.43) 0.49 (0.39) 0.982b







Table 3: Externality treatment effects
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